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In the face of on-going recession and deepening
unemployment in France, François Hollande’s commitment to
deficit reduction may soon put him at odds with voters.
by Blog Admin
In the few short months since his inauguration, French President François Hollande has seen
his popularity plummet in the face of poor government cohesion and continuing economic
crisis. Jocelyn Evans and Gilles Ivaldi argue that the French electorate now demands more
than ‘A Normal President’ in the face of anaemic economic growth and high unemployment.
In the f our months since his inauguration French President François Hollande has quickly
lurched f rom honeymoon period into cold polit ical hangover. The new presidency has
already been destabilised by conf usion, polit ical dissent within the Socialist/Green coalit ion,
and public disagreements over policy priorit ies among inexperienced cabinet members. This
episode of  poor governmental cohesion has been f ollowed with a rather worrying plunge in
popularity polls f or both the president and his prime minister.
Undoubtedly, the European economic crisis in which France f inds itself  has contributed
signif icantly to theses immediate pressures. However, a number of  additional issues f urther
constrain his room f or manoeuvre.
Policy gestures and reform reticence
Hollande has kept a certain distance f rom
direct involvement in domestic policy
implementation. He has lef t Prime Minister
Jean-Marc Ayrault to lead government and
coordinate ministerial activity, and delimited his
direct remit to the presidential domains of
f oreign policy and other head-of -state
f unctions. Cynical commentators ascribed this
to his desire to shield himself  behind his
Premier f rom the inevitable unpopularity of
economic cuts. A more charitable interpretation
is that this continued his post-Sarkozy thread
of  ‘normality’, in which he posit ions himself  as
quiet overseer of  France’s wellbeing and its
tribune on the world stage.
The risk of  such an approach is the
accusation of  inactivity, and worse, of
prevarication. Certainly, init ial policy
implementation did f ollow Hollande’s electoral promises. The SMIC – the minimum welf are income – was
raised by 2%; retirement age returned to 60; 1000 new teachers, to staf f  classes in primary schools and
provide broader support f or pupils with special needs, were delivered; and, af ter an embarrassing censure
by the Constitutional Council over the legislative means of  implementing the change, ministerial salaries
were reduced by 30%.  However, the policies necessary to address the two structural problems – a high
budget def icit and unemployment – have not yet appeared.
Any room for manoeuvre?
Those who voted f or Hollande in May 2012 expected to see a f undamental change in the French economy
and society, and soon. However, the question remains ‘how’? In the f lurry of  overseas visits which f ollowed
Hollande’s election, he managed to win a commitment f rom Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel to support
the inclusion of  a paragraph on growth in the European Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance.
But this has not diluted the original commitments to limiting state spending – a f act pounced upon by Jean-
Luc Mélenchon and the radical lef t, and closer to home, one of  a number of  issues that may see the
majority of  Greens, currently in coalit ion with the Socialists, and possibly some members of  Hollande’s own
party vote against its ratif ication in the legislature. The spectre of  the party’s polit ical debacle in the 2005
ref erendum on the European Constitutional Treaty has returned to haunt French socialists.
Similar obstacles have hampered the small but symbolic resolution to f reeze petrol prices. In the init ial post-
election period, the policy was reasonably mothballed given that petrol prices were f alling. However, as the
cost of  oil to France reaches record levels, the Financial Ministry at the Quai de Bercy is now ‘examining’
how this may be possible – an examination that may ult imately prove f utile, according to crit ics of  the
proposal who point to the lack of  inf luence the French state can have over oil prices, short of  crippling
expenditure to of f set international market rates. More generally, there seems to be very litt le leeway f or the
tradit ional Keynesian demand-side economics that are in the ideological DNA of  the lef t in France.
Actions to speak louder than words
The French Socialists thus f ace a dilemma. Living up to their promises will require some f orm of  def icit
reduction or revenue raising. Both Hollande and Ayrault have repeated their commitment to reducing the
def icit by 3% by 2013. Moreover, any cuts in spending are likely to exacerbate unemployment f urther – a
dynamic which would provide powerf ul ammunition to the Right opposition, as well as dissenting lef t-
wingers. Promised growth, in the f ace of  continued recession, is dif f icult to envisage. But as commentators
f rom across the polit ical spectrum call f or a powerf ul voice to take charge of  the country’s destiny, a self -
ef f acing, ‘normal’ and modest presence will not do the trick.  Hollande cannot polit ically af f ord to be seen
as leaden-f ooted in driving change and ref orm.
Evidently the message has reached both the Matignon and the Elysée. Accusations of  inaction have
spurred Ayrault to present a precise calendar of  ref orm f or ministers to implement upon their return f rom
the summer recess.
In recent latest TV appearances, Hollande has also showed determination to take the helm more f irmly. Last
week’s budget will lead to unprecedented budgetary cuts of  about 30 billion euros, important f iscal ref orms
– including the controversial 75% tax on the highest incomes despite f ears of  growing numbers of  tax
exiles among France’s Fortune 500 – as well as greater labour marker f lexibility to improve the country’s
competit iveness. Despite presidential assertions that f iscal ref orm will be embedded in social justice,
disastrous polls already show that the French are not prepared to wait around to see tangible economic
outcomes.
Faced with anaemic economic growth and unemployment above the symbolic three-million threshold, the
government might well be heading f or another winter of  public discontent. Whilst there would still be the
possibility of  using a change in Prime Minister as a “polit ical f use” a f ew months f rom now, the recent
Sarkozy- like and more bossy attitude adopted by Hollande incontestably puts him in the f rontline f or f uture
disgruntled voters.
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